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Aesthetic hedonism is the view that to be aesthetically good is to please. For 
most aesthetic hedonists, aesthetic normativity is hedonic normativity. This paper 
argues that Kant’s third Critique contains resources for a nonhedonic account of 
aesthetic normativity as sourced in autonomy as self-legislation. A case is made 
that the account is also Kant’s because it ties his aesthetics into a key theme of 
his larger philosophy.
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You should appreciate the Plumen 001 light bulb. Why? Well, it is beautiful. A theory of 
aesthetic normativity should answer a further question: Why does any item’s being beauti-
ful lend weight to the proposition that you should appreciate it? Until recently, the further 
question has rarely been made explicit. Its answer is too obvious, given the default theory 
of aesthetic value, aesthetic hedonism. According to aesthetic hedonism, to be beautiful is, 
roughly, to have properties that ground pleasure in suitable conditions.1 An aesthetic hedon-
ist may easily add that an item’s grounding pleasure lends weight to the proposition that 
you should appreciate it simply because anyone has reason to get pleasure. As obvious as it 
may be, some nevertheless dissent from the hedonic theory of aesthetic normativity.2 This 
paper argues that resources are to be found in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment for a 
distinctively Kantian, nonhedonic theory of aesthetic normativity, one on which the source of 
aesthetic normativity is autonomy, or self-legislation.
I. The Scope of Aesthetic Normativity
Establishing the thesis that resources are to be found in the third Critique for a distinctively 
Kantian theory of aesthetic normativity stops short of attributing the theory to Kant himself. 
A case can be made that the Kantian theory is Kant’s. Blackletter text backs it up; it meshes 
 1 Servaas van der Berg, ‘Aesthetic Hedonism and Its Critics’, Philosophy Compass 15 (2020): 1–15.
 2 For example, K. C. Bhattacharyya, ‘The Concept of Rasa’ (1930), in Indian Philosophy in English: From Renais-
sance to Independence, ed. Nalini Bhushan and Jay L. Garfield (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 195–206; 
Dominic McIver Lopes, Being for Beauty: Aesthetic Agency and Value (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); 
‘Feeling for Freedom: K. C. Bhattacharyya on Rasa’, British Journal of Aesthetics 59 (2019): 465–77; Robbie 
Kubala, ‘Grounding Aesthetic Obligations’, British Journal of Aesthetics 58 (2018): 271–85; Samantha Matherne 
and Nick Riggle, ‘Schiller on Freedom and Aesthetic Value: Part II’, British Journal of Aesthetics 61 (2021): 17–40.
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well with recent work by Alix Cohen, Melissa Merritt, and Samantha Matherne on Kant’s 
appeal to ‘common sense’;3 and it reveals a deep continuity between Kant’s aesthetics and 
the rest of his philosophy, especially as his project has been understood by Onora O’Neill, 
among others.4 These are all good reasons to attribute the theory to Kant. However, there are 
countervailing reasons too. Some are textual and will be addressed as the argument develops 
below, but one requires immediate attention. With the exception of Rachel Zuckert,5 Kant’s 
interpreters do not read him as addressing the question that calls for the theory of aesthetic 
normativity of which the distinctively Kantian theory is an example. Kant is concerned with 
aesthetic normativity in a different sense. If most interpreters are correct, the theory sketched 
below is distinctively Kantian, in as much as its elements are laid out in the third Critique, 
though their being available in the text sheds little or no light on Kant’s project.
The elements of the distinctively Kantian theory of aesthetic normativity come together 
in the ‘Deduction of Pure Aesthetic Judgments’ in § 30 to § 40, especially in light of the 
two introductions. The aim of the deduction is to show that what Kant calls pure judge-
ments of taste have certain features that he attributes to them in §§ 1–22, the ‘Analytic of 
the Beautiful’.
The ‘Analytic’ opens by defining ‘aesthetic judgements’ as those involving a ‘feeling of pleas-
ure or displeasure’.6 A subset of aesthetic judgements Kant calls ‘judgements of taste’, which 
are the judgements we typically express by calling things beautiful (CJ, 5:210; see also 5:223). 
Notice that Kant’s ‘aesthetic judgements’ are what we would now call ‘hedonic judgements’, 
and his ‘judgements of taste’ are what we now call ‘aesthetic judgements’. When doing aes-
thetics, it is hard not to use ‘aesthetic’ in the usual, contemporary sense, which clashes with 
Kant’s idiom. Henceforth, in this paper, let ‘aesthetic judgement’ name those judgements 
typically expressed by calling things beautiful.7
Four features demarcate aesthetic judgements from other hedonic judgements. First, a 
judgement, this is beautiful, involves disinterested pleasure. Other hedonic judgements bear 
‘a relation to the faculty of desire’ (CJ, 5:209): they amount either to a gratification of the incli-
nations or to taking satisfaction in the goodness of a means to an end or in the goodness of an 
end itself. In aesthetic judgement, pleasure is not felt because an object satisfies a need or ful-
fils an aim, or because an end is finally worthy. Second, aesthetic judgements are universally 
valid. Someone who judges that an item is beautiful takes the judgement to apply not just 
to herself, but to everyone (CJ, 5:212). Third, aesthetic judgement is an awareness of formal 
purposiveness in the item judged beautiful and also in the operation of the judge’s cognitive 
powers in the process of aesthetic judgement (CJ, 5:220, 5:222). More on this below. Finally, 
the ‘Analytic’ culminates in the claim that a judgement that this is beautiful represents the 
item as ‘the object of a necessary satisfaction’ (CJ, 5:240). The modality Kant intends is norma-
tive. Aesthetic judgements ‘lay claim to necessity and say, not that everyone does so judge […] 
 3 Alix Cohen, ‘Kant on the Ethics of Belief’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (2014): 317–34; ‘Kant on 
Science and Normativity’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 71 (2018): 6–12; Melissa Merritt, Kant 
on Reflection and Virtue (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); and Samantha Matherne, ‘Kant on 
Aesthetic Autonomy and Common Sense’, Philosophers’ Imprint 19 (2019): 1–22.
 4 Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989).
 5 Rachel Zuckert, Kant on Beauty and Biology: An Interpretation of the ‘Critique of Judgment’ (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010).
 6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 5:204; see also 5:214. Hereafter: CJ (page references follow the Akademie Ausgabe 
pagination).
 7 A bad habit of recent philosophy is to interchange ‘aesthetic’ and ‘artistic’. This article is principally concerned 
with aesthetic judgement and aesthetic normativity.
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but that everyone ought to so judge’ (CJ, 20:239). Hence, ‘whoever declares something to be 
beautiful wishes that everyone should approve of the object in question and similarly declare 
it to be beautiful’ (CJ, 5:237; see also 5:239).8
Interpreters agree that the task of the deduction is to demonstrate that aesthetic judge-
ments are ‘legitimate’ in the sense that they do indeed have the four features. For most inter-
preters, to demonstrate that they do have the four features is just to ‘ground the normativity of 
[aesthetic] judgements’, in the words of Henry Allison.9 On this approach, a theory of aesthetic 
normativity is just a theory that answers the following question: How can a judgement that 
is subjective nevertheless involve disinterested pleasure and demand that everyone should 
share in it? Alternatively, how can we go wrong, and fail to judge as we should, when aesthetic 
 judgements are pleasures and when beauty is not a property in any object?
Without doubt, these are core questions of Kant’s aesthetics, and they do concern aesthetic 
normativity, but they do not exhaust the phenomenon. Return to appreciating the Plumen 
001. According to Kant, appreciation is making the aesthetic judgement, this is beautiful. 
Now take two cases. Arsineh is visiting the Cooper Hewitt Museum, has chanced upon the 
light bulb, and is judging it to be beautiful. In judging it to be beautiful, she is making the 
judgement that anyone should make. By contrast, Fionn is in the next room and has never 
seen the Plumen 001. He should also judge it to be beautiful: he should look at it and make an 
aesthetic judgement. So, he should go to the light bulb display and position himself to judge 
it to be beautiful. A theory that explains why Arsineh’s judgement is one that anyone should 
make is not automatically a theory that explains why Fionn should position himself to make 
the same judgement. In particular, a theory that justifies Arsineh’s judgement as having the 
four features that demarcate it from other hedonic judgements is not a theory that answers 
the question, why should Fionn put himself in the same position as Arsineh?
Fionn heads for the museum café, and Arsineh intercepts him:
A: You should go next door see the light bulb display!
F: Why?
A: They have the Plumen 001. It’s beautiful.
F: So what?
A: When you see it, you will take a disinterested pleasure in formal purposiveness, 
and anyone should take that pleasure.
F: I have excellent taste; I grant that if I see it, I will take the pleasure that anyone 
should take. So what?
He is in a caffeine-deprived snit, but if the final ‘So what?’ is a question with an answer, then 
there is more to aesthetic normativity than is explained by a demonstration that there are 
judgements with the four features attributed to aesthetic judgements in the ‘Analytic’. A fail-
ure to do as one should when one is in conditions to make an aesthetic judgement is not the 
same as a failure to do as one should by getting into those conditions.
Mary Mothersill and Jerrold Levinson brilliantly argued that key features of Hume’s aes-
thetics remain hidden from view until we read him as concerned with how Arsineh should 
 8 As Kant insists, the aesthetic should or ought is not moral or epistemic (CJ, 5:236–37).
 9 Henry E. Allison, Kant’s Theory of Taste: A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgement (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2001), 160; see also 164–66 and Donald W. Crawford, Kant’s Aesthetic Theory (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 26–28; Hannah Ginsborg, ‘In Defence of the One-Act View: Reply to Guyer’, 
British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (2017): 421–35; Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), 107, 228–29.
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answer Fionn.10 One might go further: no aesthetic theory can be fully adequate as long as it 
lacks resources to help Arsineh answer Fionn. It will have nothing to say about why we should 
send our children to music lessons, why we should allocate state resources to the arts, or why 
we should make the arduous hike to Machu Picchu. It will satisfy us only on the question why 
we judge as we should when we judge aesthetically. We also want theory that explains why 
we should ever judge aesthetically.
If no aesthetic theory is fully adequate unless it answers Fionn, and if there are resources in 
the third Critique for a distinctively Kantian theory that answers Fionn, then it is worth taking 
seriously the proposal that the distinctively Kantian theory is also Kant’s theory. Possibly, Kant 
is not interested in a theory of aesthetic normativity that answers Fionn. If the distinctively 
Kantian theory is not Kant’s, then it is nonetheless worth serious attention as a distinctively 
Kantian theory.
II. Criteria for a Kantian Theory
Writing on the deduction, Zuckert distinguishes three questions with which she sees Kant 
as grappling, through which he articulates progressively stronger conceptions of aesthetic 
normativity.11 First, why is it the case that all are able to judge aesthetically? Second, why 
must it be the case that all are able to judge aesthetically? Third, why should all judge 
aesthetically? These three questions lay out a road map to a distinctively Kantian theory of 
aesthetic normativity.
An answer to the first question will point to a principle whose operation is constitutive of 
aesthetic judgement and that is part of our cognitive endowment. We are all able to judge 
aesthetically because the capacity for aesthetic judgement comes with our capacity to judge 
empirically.
In answer to the second question, the operation of this principle turns out to be neces-
sary for having any experience at all – not just aesthetic experience. Hence, as long as we 
have a capacity to experience the world at all, we must also have the capacity for aesthetic 
judgement.
Question three requests a theory of aesthetic normativity that answers Fionn. An explana-
tion, in answer to the second question, of why we must all be equipped with such cognitive 
powers as enable us to make aesthetic judgements does not explain why we should ever use 
the equipment we must have.
Zuckert’s three questions also hint at a pair of conditions that must be met by a distinc-
tively Kantian theory of aesthetic normativity. A theory is distinctively Kantian only if it is 
a product of the reasoning in the ‘Analytic of the Beautiful’ and the ‘Deduction of Pure 
Aesthetic Judgements’. That is, first, it had better explain aesthetic normativity by appeal to 
the features that demarcate aesthetic judgement from other kinds of hedonic judgement. 
Call this the ‘demarcation condition’. Second, a distinctively Kantian theory had better tap 
the ambition of the ‘Deduction’, explaining aesthetic normativity using the special appa-
ratus of a transcendental deduction that appeals to a priori principles that are needed for 
any kind of experience (CJ, 20:239, 5:280–81, 5:288). Call this the ‘deduction condition’. 
Together the demarcation and deduction conditions tell us when a theory of aesthetic nor-
mativity is not merely in the text of the third Critique but is a product of the philosophical 
project of the text.
 10 Mary Mothersill, ‘Hume and the Paradox of Taste’, in Aesthetics: A Critical Anthology, ed. George Dickie, Richard 
Sclafani, and Ronald Roblin (New York: St Martin’s, 1989), 269–86, and Jerrold Levinson, ‘Hume’s Standard of 
Taste: The Real Problem’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 60 (2002): 227–38.
 11 Zuckert, Kant on Beauty, 335; see also 346, 360, and 366–67.
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III. Hedonic and Super-Hedonic Normativity
Before turning to Zuckert’s theory and then the autonomy-based theory, here are two obvi-
ous theories of aesthetic normativity that are not distinctively Kantian. Seeing where these 
theories go wrong for Kant illustrates how the reasoning in the ‘Analytic’ and the ‘Deduction’ 
points to a distinctively Kantian approach.
Aesthetic hedonists hold roughly that to be beautiful is to have properties that ground 
pleasure. From aesthetic hedonism it is a short step to a hedonic theory of aesthetic norma-
tivity. Fionn admits that if he visits the Plumen 001, he will take the pleasure in it that anyone 
should take in it, but then wonders why he should visit it. Many will regard Arsineh’s reply as 
obvious: anyone always has reason to get pleasure. His having reason to get pleasure lends 
weight to the proposition that he should see the light bulb. Explanations of normativity bot-
tom out at pleasure: the correct answer to ‘What is so great about pleasure?’ is a shrug.
Even if Kant is not an aesthetic hedonist, one might think he could adopt a hedonic theory 
of aesthetic normativity. According to Kant, something in an item together with the opera-
tions of cognition in response to the item grounds an aesthetic judgement; aesthetic judge-
ment is awareness of ‘the subjective purposiveness of that form for the power of judgment’ 
(CJ, 5:290). So long as what gets grounded is aesthetic judgement rather than beauty, Kant is 
not strictly speaking an aesthetic hedonist.12 All the same, if seeing the Plumen 001 grounds 
aesthetic judgement and aesthetic judgement implicates pleasure, then one might think that 
the reason why Fionn should go judge the light bulb to be beautiful is that anyone always has 
reason to go get pleasure. The correct answer to ‘What is so great about aesthetic judgement?’ 
is ‘It is pleasing’, followed by a shrug.
Call this the ‘simple hedonic theory’ of aesthetic normativity. The hypothesis that the sim-
ple hedonic theory is in fact Kant’s would have the virtue of explaining why Kant does not 
make explicit the resources he has to answer Fionn. The simple hedonic theory’s answer is 
too obvious to need spelling out; it can be taken for granted.
However, the simple hedonic theory is not a distinctively Kantian theory, because it satisfies 
neither the demarcation nor the deduction condition. According to Kant, aesthetic normativ-
ity is not plain hedonic normativity; it is grounded in some demarcating feature of aesthetic 
judgement in a way that requires a deduction.
The failure of the simple hedonic theory to satisfy the demarcation condition suggests 
another, more Kantian, hedonic theory of aesthetic normativity. We ask whether we can 
answer Fionn by latching onto a demarcating feature of aesthetic judgement – its being dis-
interested or universal, or its involving awareness of formal purposiveness.
Universality is the eminently eligible candidate. Someone who judges that an item is 
beautiful takes the judgement to apply not just to themselves, but to everyone (CJ, 5:212). 
Moreover, in as much as aesthetic judgements are universally valid, they are grounds for 
sharing. According to the ‘super-hedonic theory’ of aesthetic normativity, Fionn has reason 
to go judge the Plumen 001 beautiful because anyone has special reason to take pleasure in 
 12 The matter is hardly straightforward. Kant denies that beauty is an objective property of an item, one attribut-
able on the basis of a rule, or concept (for example, CJ, 5:280–84, 5:337–41, 5:346–50). Contemporary aesthetic 
hedonists agree. They say that the grounds of pleasure in an item constitute beauty only in relation to a subjec-
tive response. ‘Beauty,’ as Kant writes, ‘is nothing by itself, without relation to the feeling of the subject’ (CJ, 
5:218). Accordingly, aesthetic judgement ‘consists precisely in the fact that it calls a thing beautiful only in 
accordance with that quality in [the item] by means of which [the item] corresponds with our way of receiving it’ 
(CJ, 5:282). For contemporary aesthetic hedonists, such assertions suffice to endorse their view of what beauty 
is. See also Zuckert, Kant on Beauty, chap. 5; Brian Watkins, ‘The Subjective Basis of Kant’s Judgment of Taste’, 
Inquiry 54 (2011): 315–36. At any rate, one need not be an aesthetic hedonist in order to adopt a hedonic theory 
of aesthetic normativity.
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what pleases everyone else. When pleasures are shared, their being shared is special reason 
to undergo them. Hume beautifully observes how
everyone has the most ardent desire of society, and is fitted for it by the most advan-
tages. We can form no wish, which has not a reference to society. A perfect solitude 
is, perhaps, the greatest punishment we can suffer. Every pleasure languishes when 
enjoy’d a-part from company, and every pain becomes more cruel and intolerable.13
Kant agrees that human beings naturally tend to sociability and are often not ‘content with 
an object if [they] cannot feel [their] satisfaction in it in community with others’ (CJ, 5:297). 
Indeed, sociability causes a refinement of pleasure, so that
sensations have value only to the extent that they may be universally communicated; 
at that point, even though the pleasure that each has in such an object is merely 
inconsiderable and has in itself no noticeable interest, nevertheless the idea of its 
 universal communicability almost infinitely increases its value. (CJ, 5:297)
Here Kant confesses a deep appreciation of how aesthetic judgement contributes to social 
life. Surely the importance of social life can ground an answer to Fionn. Arsineh can say, ‘look, 
we have come here to be together and, as you have just admitted, sharing in an aesthetic 
judgement is a way of being together’.
Alas, the super-hedonic theory (partly) satisfies the demarcation condition but not the deduc-
tion condition. Kant is adamant on the point. Our interest in sociability and in aesthetic judge-
ment as promoting sociability is ‘empirical’. Hence, ‘it is of no importance for us here, for we 
must find that importance only in what may be related to the judgment of taste a priori, even if 
only indirectly’ (CJ, 5:297; see also 5:218). A distinctively Kantian theory of aesthetic normativ-
ity is not merely one that answers to anthropological truths; it must be established through a 
transcendental deduction that invokes a priori principles needed for any kind of experience.
Seeing why the hedonic and super-hedonic theories of aesthetic normativity are neither 
Kant’s theories nor distinctively Kantian theories displays the kinds of resources we should 
seek within the third Critique to assemble a Kantian theory of aesthetic normativity.
IV. Cognitive Normativity
As we saw, Zuckert reads Kant as cumulatively answering three questions. First, why is it the 
case that all are able to judge aesthetically? Second, why must it be the case that all are able to 
judge aesthetically? Third, why should all judge aesthetically? Kant’s answer to the third ques-
tion combines the answer to the second with a commitment that animates his larger project.
In outline, the reasoning is that anyone should go judge the Plumen 001 to be beautiful 
because,
C1. aesthetic judgement is awareness of formal purposiveness,
C2. so, aesthetic judgement is awareness of the harmonious free play of imagination 
and understanding, and
 13 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. P. H. Nidditch. 3rd ed. (1777; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1975), 363; see also Paul Guyer, ‘The Standard of Taste and the “Most Ardent Desire of  Society”’, 
in Values of Beauty: Historical Essays in Aesthetics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 37–74; 
Andy Egan, ‘Disputing about Taste’, in Disagreement, ed. Richard Feldman and Ted A. Warfield (Oxford: Oxford 
 University Press, 2010), 247–92.
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C3. the harmonious free play of imagination and understanding provides for concep-
tual amelioration, and
C4. anyone always has reason to do what provides for conceptual amelioration.
Aesthetic normativity is cognitive normativity.
Notice how the theory meets the demarcation condition: it is anchored in the claim that 
aesthetic judgement is awareness of purposiveness. Kant introduces formal purposiveness 
as a twofold phenomenon. On one hand, an aesthetic judgement is an awareness of formal 
purposiveness in the item judged (CJ, 5:279). On the other hand, an aesthetic judgement is 
also an awareness of formal purposiveness in the operation of our own cognitive faculties: it 
‘bring[s] to our attention […] the purposive form in the determination of the powers of repre-
sentation that are occupied with [the item]’ (CJ, 5:228). The two folds integrate as an aware-
ness of how formal purposiveness in the item ‘suits’ formal purposiveness in the operation of 
the faculties (CJ, 5:189–90, 5:194, 5:279, 5:292).
The transition from (C1) to (C2) ties awareness of formal purposiveness to the harmonious 
free play of the imagination and understanding. Kant contrasts the harmonious free play of 
imagination and understanding in aesthetic judgement with their harmonious relation in 
empirical judgement. Aesthetic judgement
accompanies the common apprehension of an object by the imagination, as a faculty 
of intuition, in relation to the understanding, as a faculty of concepts, by means of a 
procedure of the power of judgment, which it must also exercise for the sake of the 
most common experience: only in the latter case it is compelled to do for the sake of 
an empirical objective concept, while in the former case (in the aesthetic judging) it is 
merely for the sake of perceiving the suitability of the representation for the harmoni-
ous (subjectively purposive) occupation of both cognitive facilities in their freedom, 
i.e., to sense the representational state with pleasure. (CJ, 5:292)
In seeing an item as a flower, imagination supplies a structured sense impression, under-
standing supplies a concept, and the faculty of judgement subsumes the structured sense 
impression under the concept of a flower. Stable equilibrium is achieved, and the play of 
imagination and understanding halts. By contrast, aesthetic judgements work as follows. 
You see an item. Imagination structures sense impressions, while understanding delivers 
concepts, but no stable equilibrium is achieved. Rather, you are confronted with how the 
item is suitable for both imagination and understanding to keep on operating in free or 
dynamic equilibrium, both ‘enlivened through mutual agreement’ (CJ, 5:219). Aesthetic 
judgement is ‘consciousness of the merely formal purposiveness in the play of the cognitive 
powers’ (CJ, 5:222).14
Now to the deduction condition. Nature is diverse, and no experience is possible unless 
the faculty of judgement deploys a scheme of empirical concepts that find order and inter-
connection in nature’s diversity. The principle of purposiveness is an a priori principle nec-
essary for any experience, for it enjoins that the faculty of judgement find such order and 
 14 Alternatively, for consistency with ‘two-act’ interpretations, the claim can be restated to say that aesthetic judge-
ment is grounded in awareness of the harmonious free play of imagination and understanding. See Paul Guyer, 
‘One Act or Two? Hannah Ginsborg on Aesthetic Judgement’, British Journal of Aesthetics 57 (2017): 407–19; 
comp. Hannah Ginsborg, ‘Kant on Aesthetic and Biological Purposiveness’, in Reclaiming the History of Ethics: 
Essays for John Rawls, ed. Andrews Reath, Barbara Herman, and Christine Korsgaard (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997), 329–60; ‘In Defence of the One-Act View’.
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interconnection in the diversity of nature as can make experience possible (CJ, 5:180, 5:183–
86, 5:193–94). However, many schemes of empirical concepts are possible, and some capture 
more order and interconnection than others. We should therefore check to see whether we 
can ameliorate our scheme of empirical concepts. To do this, we rely on the harmonious 
free play of imagination and understanding. When imagination and understanding are in 
harmonious free play, we ‘glimpse sensibly given objects as more fully determined than our 
conceptual apparatus allows us to see’.15 Hence, aesthetic judgement is ‘a microcosmic, sen-
sible, unconceptualized image of the unity among the contingent, heterogeneous aspects of 
nature to which we aspire in empirical cognition’.16 Our aspiring to conceptual amelioration 
is reason for us to put ourselves in conditions where imagination and understanding are in 
harmonious free play.
What about (C4)? The assumption that anyone always has reason to do what serves con-
ceptual amelioration is a general commitment of Kant’s philosophy. Zuckert’s proposal is a 
good model of a theory of aesthetic normativity that satisfies the demarcation and deduction 
conditions and that relies on an assumption about a source of nonhedonic normativity at the 
centre of Kant’s project.
V. Autonomy-Based Normativity
Why can all judge aesthetically? Why must it be that all can judge aesthetically? Why should 
all judge aesthetically? This paper locates resources for an answer to the third question by 
combining the answer to the second question with the commitment to autonomy as self-
legislation that animates Kant’s larger project. The resulting theory of aesthetic normativity 
also meets the demarcation and deduction conditions.
In outline, the reasoning is that anyone should go judge the Plumen 001 to be beautiful 
because,
A1. aesthetic judgement is awareness of formal purposiveness,
A2. so, aesthetic judgement is awareness of the harmonious free play of imagination 
and understanding,
A3. so, aesthetic judgement is autonomous and
A4. anyone always has reason to go judge autonomously.
Aesthetic normativity is sourced in the normativity of autonomy.
The idea is not to equate autonomy with freedom in the play of imagination and under-
standing.17 That facile idea satisfies neither the demarcation nor the deduction conditions, 
and it caricatures Kant’s conception of autonomy. To cash out the proposal, we need to exam-
ine the details of (A1) to (A4), especially (A3), the key claim. Section IV addressed (A1) and 
(A2). Following a few words about (A4), this section traces two routes to (A3) that meet the 
demarcation and deduction conditions.
V.1. Autonomy
Suppose that (A3) is true and aesthetic judgement is autonomous. From this it follows that 
anyone should go judge the Plumen 001 to be beautiful only given (A4), the claim that any-
one always has reason to go judge autonomously.
 15 Zuckert, Kant on Beauty, 265.
 16 Ibid., 367.
 17 See also Karl Ameriks, ‘On the Many Senses of “Self-Determination”’, Proceedings and Addresses of the American 
Philosophical Association 92 (2018): 258–83.
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Commentators agree that, for Kant, anyone has reason to act and think autonomously, but 
they disagree about why. For some, Kant regards autonomy as an ultimate source of normativ-
ity: it is primitive that we have reason to act and think in ways that express autonomy.18 The 
correct answer to ‘Why act autonomously?’ is a shrug. For others, autonomy is reason-giving 
because it comprises having a good will,19 or because it confers dignity,20 or because it realizes 
our humanity and rational nature.21
The jury remains out, and it is beyond the jurisdiction of this paper to issue new instruc-
tions from the bench. Different positions on what makes autonomy a source of normativity 
might put some spin on the autonomy-based theory of aesthetic normativity, but the pos-
sibility must remain speculative until the theory is on the table.
More pressing is what constitutes autonomy in the first place, rather than its normativ-
ity. Obviously, no interpretation of Kant’s aesthetics should be saddled with a conception of 
autonomy as moral autonomy, or freedom of the will. Just as it is a mistake to conflate the 
aesthetic ought with a moral ought, it is also a mistake to conflate autonomy in apprecia-
tion with moral autonomy. Again, Kant is explicit: aesthetic pleasure is not produced by the 
determination ‘of the higher faculty of desire through pure reason’ (CJ, 5:190, see also 20:225, 
5:176–77, 5:196–97).
Presumably, aesthetic and moral autonomy are species of a broader phenomenon. The con-
sensus among commentators is that autonomy is, broadly speaking, self-legislation.22 Yet, 
these same commentators disagree about the details. In as much as the present task is to put 
the autonomy-based theory of aesthetic normativity on the table, let us defer to another day 
any inquiry into whether the autonomy-based theory is subtly affected by varying accounts 
of autonomy as self-legislation.
Making do with a broad conception of autonomy as self-legislation does not leave us bereft 
of detail, for Kant may be read as articulating two conceptions of autonomy in the third 
Critique. Self-legislation occurs twice in Kant’s aesthetics, once at the level of the principles 
by which the faculties operate, and then again at the level of what Kant calls ‘common sense’, 
which has to do with the policies that individuals should adopt. Each of the next two subsec-
tions makes a case for (A3): one at the level of principles and the other at the level of policies.
V.2. Autonomy at the Level of Principles: Purposiveness
Kant defines the higher faculties as those that ‘contain an autonomy’ (CJ, 5:177–78, 5:196–
97). Each higher faculty operates by means of a constitutive principle that is unique to it but 
that is determined by the higher faculties. In one sense, self-legislation just is the condition 
wherein the constitutive principle of a higher faculty is determined by the higher faculties. 
Reason gives the rule to desire. That is moral autonomy. Understanding gives the rule to cog-
nition. That is epistemic autonomy. Judgement gives its constitutive principle to itself. That 
 18 O’Neill, Constructions of Reason; Robert N. Johnson, ‘Value and Autonomy in Kantian Ethics’, in Oxford Studies 
in Metaethics, ed. Russ Shafer-Landau, vol. 2 (Oxford University Press, 2007), 133–48; Oliver Sensen, ‘The Moral 
Importance of Autonomy’, in Kant on Moral Autonomy, ed. Oliver Sensen (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 262–81.
 19 Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
 20 Paul Guyer, ‘The Value of Reason and the Value of Freedom’, Ethics 109 (1998): 30–35.
 21 Richard L. Velkley, Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant’s Critical Philosophy (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Allen Wood, Kant’s Ethical Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999).
 22 Thomas E. Hill, Jr., ‘The Kantian Conception of Autonomy’, in The Inner Citadel: Essays on Individual Autonomy, 
ed. John Christman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 91–105; O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, 53–59; 
Sensen, ‘Moral Importance of Autonomy’, 267–70; Ameriks, ‘On the Many Senses of “Self-Determination”’.
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is aesthetic autonomy, or ‘heautonomy’, the special case where a faculty gives a principle to 
itself (CJ, 20:225).
The principle constitutive of the faculty of judgement and given by judgement to itself 
is the principle of purposiveness. Moreover, the principle is needed for any experience to 
be possible. As we saw, nature is diverse, and no experience is possible unless the faculty of 
judgement deploys a scheme of empirical concepts that find order and interconnection in 
nature’s diversity. So, the faculty of judgement enjoins itself to find such order and inter-
connection in the diversity of nature as can make experience possible (CJ, 5:180, 5:184–85, 
5:193). It is, as it were, baked into the faculty of judgement that it prepares itself to find 
nature ready to fit its apprehension.
Now the link to aesthetic judgement. All can judge aesthetically, and all must have a capacity 
for aesthetic judgement. Why? Kant answers that the principle of purposiveness so structures 
cognition that it must be the case that everyone can be aware of ‘reciprocally animating’ imag-
ination and understanding in harmonious free play (CJ, 5:287). In other words, the principle 
of aesthetic judgement is the principle constitutive of the faculty of judgement (CJ, 5:286).
Aesthetic judgement is, as we know, an awareness of how purposiveness in the item suits 
purposiveness in the operation of the cognition. Here awareness of purposiveness is sub-
jective, not determined by any concept or end, because it is what is apprehended in the 
harmonious free play of imagination and understanding (CJ, 5:194, 5:287).23 So, aesthetic 
judgement, being an awareness of how purposiveness in the item suits purposiveness in 
the operation of the cognition, amounts to awareness of how cognition is structured to find 
nature ready to fit its apprehension. Some awareness of how cognition is so structured might 
lurk in the background of an ordinary empirical judgement, such as the judgement that this 
is a flower. However, in ordinary empirical judgement, awareness of how cognition is so struc-
tured is awareness of imagination and understanding harmoniously operating to actually 
find some bit of nature actually fitting its apprehension. In aesthetic judgement, we are not 
aware of that. An aesthetic judgement is an exemplary instance of a general awareness of 
nothing but cognition having been set up in accordance with the principle of purposiveness. 
Aesthetic judgement is entirely determined by cognition as structured by the principle of 
purposiveness.
The case for (A3) comprises three claims. First, the principle of purposiveness is legislated 
by the faculty of judgement to itself. Second, aesthetic judgement is entirely determined 
by cognition as structured by the principle of purposiveness. Third, aesthetic judgement is 
autonomous when it is entirely determined by cognition as structured by the principle of 
purposiveness. Therefore, aesthetic judgement is autonomous. As Kant explains in the first 
introduction, aesthetic judgement is grounded ‘not merely in the feeling of pleasure and 
displeasure in itself alone, but at the same time […] in the rule of the power of judgement, 
which is thus legislative with regard to the conditions of reflection a priori, and demonstrates 
autonomy’ (CJ, 20:225).
Recall Arsineh judging the Plumen 001 to be beautiful. Her judgement is one that she 
should make. In making it, she judges that she is, in that very judgement, judging the light 
bulb as it should be judged.24 Now to Fionn. He grants that if he judges it to be beautiful, 
then he will judge that he is, in that very judgement, judging it as it should be judged. Yet he 
 23 The role of the harmonious free play of imagination and understanding in awareness of subjective, formal 
purposiveness also explains why the harmonious free play of imagination and understanding is a pleasure. 
However, the present task is not to explain why an aesthetic judgement is a pleasure; the task is to pinpoint a 
nonhedonic reason to go judge aesthetically.
 24 Ginsborg, ‘Kant on Aesthetic and Biological Purposiveness’, 349.
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wonders why he should go view the light bulb and judge it to be beautiful. He asks Zuckert’s 
third question. The reply to him is that, by going to judge the light bulb beautiful, he will be 
making a judgement that is entirely determined by the faculty of judgement operating as it 
has legislated to itself to operate, to do that is to judge autonomously, entirely on the basis of 
self-legislation, and anyone always has reason to think and act autonomously.
V.3. Autonomy at the Level of Policies: Common Sense
In as much as the faculties operate on principles that are constitutive, hence not learned and 
not ones that we can choose to abrogate, autonomy at the level of the principles is not agen-
tive. Yet Kant’s aesthetics also accommodates agentive autonomy.25 Someone presented with 
a beautiful light bulb might nevertheless fail to find it beautiful because they fail to proceed 
in ways wherein their cognitive capacities operate according to design spec. They fail to exer-
cise ‘common sense’.
Common sense first appears in § 20 to § 22 of the ‘Analytic’, where Kant articulates the 
normative claim about aesthetic judgement. It appears that, unless what goes for you goes 
for all, your judgement that this light bulb is beautiful cannot say that anyone but you should 
appreciate it. We must assume some common sense ‘to justify judgements that contain a 
“should”’ (CJ, 5:239; see also 5:235). Given the task of the deduction, which is to vindicate 
aesthetic normativity subject to the demarcation condition, it is no surprise that Kant returns 
to common sense, in § 40, at the close of the ‘Deduction’.26
For an individual to exercise common sense, they must learn and follow certain policies – 
Kant calls them ‘maxims’ and ‘ways of thinking’ (CJ, 5:294–95).27 First, think for yourself. So 
doing mitigates prejudice. Second, think in the position of everyone else, broad-mindedly. 
So doing mitigates the effect of ‘subjective private conditions’ on judgement. Third, think 
consistently. All three policies appear together at several places in the oeuvre, from the early 
works onwards, and they articulate Kant’s picture of the best use of our faculties in epistemic, 
moral, and aesthetic contexts alike.28 So, not only do we share the same faculties, but we also 
share policies of thought that equip us to take advantage of the capacity for the harmonious 
free play of imagination and understanding.
Incidentally, correctly understanding the three policies of common sense guards against 
a reading of Kant, especially §§ 31–32, that headlines in the recent, heated debates about 
aesthetic acquaintance. According to what Richard Wollheim called the ‘acquaintance prin-
ciple’, ‘aesthetic judgements […] must be based on first-hand experience of their objects 
and are not, except within very narrow limits, transmissible from one person to another’.29 
In the debate over this principle, Kant is often enlisted on Wollheim’s side.30 He is rou-
 25 See also Sensen, ‘Moral Importance of Autonomy’, 268–70.
 26 See also Jennifer Kirchmyer Dobe, ‘Kant’s Common Sense and the Strategy for a Deduction’, Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 68 (2010): 47–60.
 27 See also O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, 25–26; Rudolf A. Makkreel, ‘Reflection, Reflective Judgment, and 
Aesthetic Exemplarity’, in Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy, ed. Rebecca Kukla (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2006), 223–44; Merritt, Kant on Reflection and Virtue, chap. 2.
 28 Cohen, ‘Kant on the Ethics of Belief’, 328–31; ‘Kant on Science and Normativity’; Merritt, Kant on Reflection and 
Virtue, chap. 2.
 29 Richard Wollheim, Art and Its Objects, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 233.
 30 Robert Hopkins, ‘Beauty and Testimony’, in Philosophy, the Good, the True, the Beautiful, ed. Anthony O’Hear 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 209–36; ‘Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic 
Judgement’, European Journal of Philosophy 9 (2001): 166–89; ‘How to Be a Pessimist about Aesthetic Testi-
mony’, Journal of Philosophy 108 (2011): 138–57; Cain Todd, ‘Quasi-Realism, Acquaintance, and the Normative 
Claims of Aesthetic Judgement’, British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (2004): 277–96; Andrew McGonigal, ‘The Auton-
omy of Aesthetic Judgement’, British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (2006): 331–48; Keren Gorodeisky, ‘A New Look at 
Lopes: Beyond the Pleasure Principle12
tinely quoted as insisting that, in matters aesthetic, each is to ‘judge for himself, without 
having to grope about by means of experience among the judgments of others’ and that 
‘if someone does not find a building, a view, or a poem beautiful, then […] he does not 
allow approval to be internally imposed upon himself by a hundred voices who all praise it 
highly’ (CJ, 5:282 and 5:284). In the acquaintance debate, such statements as these are said 
to express Kant’s commitment to aesthetic ‘autonomy’, the claim that aesthetic testimony 
is always weak or inapt.
Obviously, this is not autonomy in the sense of self-legislation, and Matherne argues that 
the emphasis on the oft-quoted passages (and the story of the young poet) distorts Kant’s 
message about common sense.31 To begin with, we must not only think for ourselves; we 
must also place ourselves in the position of everyone else. In addition, the point of thinking 
for ourselves is to mitigate prejudice. O’Neill puts it well: to think for oneself ‘demands only 
that there be a plurality of parties to any debate, whose thinking and judging are to some 
extent independent’.32 Kant recommends adopting all three of the policies of common sense 
in order to unlock the capacity for aesthetic response.
So, autonomy is not identical to the policy, think for yourself. Rather, it is self-legislation.33
How does common sense implicate autonomy as self-legislation? Cohen argues that it falls 
to reason to legislate for a thinker that they adopt the policies of common sense, and since 
the legislation of reason is self-legislation and since self-legislation is autonomy, adopting 
the policies expresses autonomy at an agentive level.34 She concludes that ‘autonomy is the 
principle that grounds epistemic normativity as well as moral normativity. Contrary to what 
is often assumed, it is not just the remit of morality. Our capacity for self-legislation also 
underlies our cognitive activity.’35
Matherne extends Cohen’s point to aesthetic judgement: we adopt and conform to the pol-
icies of common sense, which smooth the path to the harmonious free play of imagination 
and understanding. In this way, our capacity for self-legislation shapes our aesthetic activity.36 
The minute we bend the rules and violate the policies of common sense, we risk failing to 
engage in a harmonious free play of imagination and understanding. In Cohen’s metaphor, 
‘our mind stops being its own guide’.37
Here is the second case for (A3). First, individuals ‘legislate’ for themselves that they adopt 
the policies of common sense. Second, the policies of common sense facilitate the harmoni-
ous free play of imagination and understanding. So, it follows that to adopt the policies of 
common sense in making aesthetic judgements is to act autonomously. If (A4) is true and 
anyone always has reason to go judge autonomously, then Arsineh has a second autonomy-
based answer to Fionn.
Kant’s View of Aesthetic Testimony’, British Journal of Aesthetics 50 (2010): 53–70; Eileen John, ‘Beauty, Interest, 
and Autonomy’, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 70 (2012): 193–202; Amir Konigsberg, ‘The Acquaintance 
Principle, Aesthetic Autonomy, and Aesthetic Appreciation’, British Journal of Aesthetics 52 (2013): 153–68. 
 31 Matherne, ‘Kant on Aesthetic Testimony’.
 32 O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, 46.
 33 In addition, autonomy is not the same as the suspension of private interests and inclinations, though the exer-
cises of moral, epistemic, and aesthetic autonomy all effect such a suspension. We have reason to act and judge 
just because in doing so we act or judge out of principles or policies that are self-legislated. We do not have 
reason to act or judge just because in doing so we act or judge disinterestedly.
 34 Cohen, ‘Kant on Science and Normativity’, 6.
 35 Ibid.; see also O’Neill, Constructions of Reason.
 36 Matherne, ‘Kant on Aesthetic Autonomy’.
 37 Ibid., 6.
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V.4. Two Theories, or One?
The hedonic and super-hedonic theories of aesthetic normativity are not distinctively Kantian, 
for the hedonic theory fails to satisfy the demarcation condition and both fail to satisfy the 
deduction condition. Zuckert’s proposal has legs. What lends weight to the proposition that 
Fionn should go judge the Plumen 001 to be beautiful is that aesthetic judgement puts imag-
ination and understanding into a harmonious free play that ultimately serves conceptual 
amelioration. Presumably, anyone always has reason to do what serves conceptual ameliora-
tion. Aesthetic normativity is cognitive. This section has made a case for the proposal that 
aesthetic normativity is sourced in autonomy, given that anyone always has reason to think 
and act autonomously. Is the new proposal in competition with Zuckert’s? That depends. 
They complement each other, if they bring Kant’s aesthetics in line with a deep aspiration of 
his overall philosophy.
Philosophers nowadays place cognitive and autonomy-based normativity in separate enve-
lopes, but the work of O’Neill suggests caution in projecting this recent way of thinking onto 
Kant’s critical project.38 She argues that it is a mistake to read the first Critique as grounding 
epistemic normativity in the authority of reason and to read the Groundwork as grounding 
practical normativity in the authority of autonomy. The great ambition of the critical project, 
taken as a whole, is to close the gap between reason and autonomy. Reason grounds epis-
temic normativity because ‘only autonomous, self-disciplining beings can act on principles 
that we have ground to call principles of reason’ and ‘nothing counts as reason except the 
principles of self-discipline or autonomy that cannot be wholly dispensed with in thinking 
or acting’.39
If O’Neill is correct, then aesthetic judgement is a site where reason and autonomy interact 
in a distinctive manner. Although the two introductions trumpet the theme of autonomy as 
self-legislation, the theme somewhat recedes elsewhere in the third Critique, so it is natural 
to ally the principle of purposiveness to the authority of reason. But the principle’s alliance 
with the authority of reason is consistent with its ultimate allegiance to the authority of 
autonomy. Why does anyone always have reason to judge in a way that promotes conceptual 
amelioration? An answer can be that, by so doing, we act as autonomous, self-disciplined 
beings, where anyone always has reason to act autonomously.
O’Neill highlights parallels between Kant’s thinking about reason and politics.40 ‘Reason 
and justice are,’ she writes, ‘two aspects to the solution of the problems that arise when an 
uncoordinated plurality of agents is to share a possible world.’41 Just as justice requires prin-
ciples adopted by free agents, the rational authority that brings us in line with one another 
is attainable only by those ‘capable of autonomy in the strict Kantian sense’.42 Strictly speak-
ing, autonomy is seated in self-legislation and the policies of common sense. So, reflecting 
the political metaphor back out from reason and onto aesthetics, we can see the aesthetic 
domain as one where we act in ways that generate shared pleasures because aesthetic judge-
ment involves the mind working under its own guidance and because it involves each of us 
doing our best to use common sense, to think for ourselves while putting ourselves in others’ 
shoes. O’Neill regards it as Kant’s deepest insight that ‘beings who share a world […] cannot 
base this sharing on adopting unsharable principles’.43
 38 O’Neill, Constructions of Reason, chap. 3.
 39 Ibid., 57 and 64.
 40 Ibid.
 41 Ibid., 16.
 42 Ibid., 23.
 43 Ibid., 27.
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VI. A Kantian Theory, or Kant’s?
Grant that the autonomy-based theory of aesthetic normativity is Kantian, for it answers 
Zuckert’s third question, or Fionn’s question to Arsineh, in a way that meets the demarca-
tion and deduction conditions. So far the argument has been that passages of text lend it 
weight, as does its good fit with recent interpretations of the role of common sense and the 
tie between reason and autonomy in Kant’s larger project. The theory also spotlights some 
otherwise recessive features of the third Critique, knitting it into his larger philosophical 
project. Nevertheless, is the Kantian theory Kant’s theory? Our feeling the need to answer 
Fionn does not bind Kant, obviously, and maybe he does not address Zuckert’s third question. 
The price of taking this line will be that Kant’s theory does not, in the end, answer all the 
questions we want a theory to answer. Is there reason to pay the price? Here are a couple of 
considerations that seem to distance Kant from the Kantian theory, with tentative replies.44
As was noted above, the theme of autonomy as self-legislation features prominently in the 
two introductions, but recedes elsewhere in the third Critique, and the same goes for the self-
legislated principle itself, the principle of purposiveness (esp. CJ, 20:226, 20:229, 20:232–33, 
20:255, 5:169, 5:191). One of this paper’s readers remarked that Kant ‘forgets about it alto-
gether’ in the ‘Analytic’ and the ‘Deduction’. This undercuts the argument to (A3), the claim 
that aesthetic judgement is autonomous, from the claim that the principle of purposiveness 
is self-legislated. Only the argument from common sense is left standing. A pair of observa-
tions might soften the blow.
For a start, the introductions may be seen as making an essential contribution that is not 
repeated in the main text because the contribution is one that specifically ties the aesthet-
ics into the larger philosophical project. Thus both introductions end with tables listing the 
faculties of the mind with their distinct constitutive principles, this division being reflected 
in the main divisions of Kant’s philosophy. What are the chances this was not front and centre 
for Kant as he worked through his aesthetics?
Turning to the text, Kant’s discussions of the principle of purposiveness in the introduc-
tions come in the context of the thought that aesthetic judgements are ‘subject to a critique 
with regard to their possibility’ (CJ, 5:191), which will require the deduction of an a priori 
principle, the same principle as is constitutive of teleological judgement (CJ, 5:169). The same 
thought recurs in § 36 of the ‘Deduction’. Aesthetic judgement ‘must be grounded in some-
thing as an a priori principle’ and so ‘requires a deduction’ (CJ, 5:288). The task of the deduc-
tion ‘concerns the a priori principles of the pure power of judgment in aesthetic judgments’ 
(ibid.). What else could it be but the principle of purposiveness that Kant has in mind here?
A second consideration that seems to distance Kant from the Kantian theory is that the 
autonomy-based theory of aesthetic normativity ultimately unravels what appears to be 
Kant’s keen interest in demarcating aesthetic judgement. Cases of empirical cognition, such 
as the judgement that this is a rose, are also products of cognition structured by the principle 
of purposiveness, and they are often products of cognition guided by the policies of common 
sense. Yet empirical judgement is not aesthetic judgement. The problem is that neither the 
principle of purposiveness nor the policies of common sense are distinctively aesthetic. Kant 
surely would not contemplate a theory of aesthetic normativity that compromises his theory 
of aesthetic judgement.
 44 A third concern is that Kant’s doctrine of aesthetic ideas is needed for an explanation of how harmonious free 
play of imagination and understanding can be self-sustaining, and that explanation is incompatible with appeal 
to the principle of purposiveness. A close look at the compatibility of the Kantian theory of aesthetic normativity 
with the doctrine of aesthetic ideas requires another paper. My thanks to Zoltán Papp for pressing this point and 
the considerations that seem to distance Kant from the Kantian theory.
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In fact, Kant does think that empirical judgement can involve pleasure, sometimes ‘a very 
noticeable pleasure’ (CJ, 5:187). When pleasure in empirical judgement is no longer notice-
able, it was once there, and, to feel it again, ‘it requires study to make us attentive to the pur-
posiveness of nature for our understanding in our judging of it’ (CJ, 5:187–88). This pleasure 
is not aesthetic judgement, though, because it arises from the harmonious relation of the 
imagination and understanding rather than their harmonious free play. Only in aesthetic 
judgement is the autonomy of the faculty of judgement manifest in the harmonious free 
play of imagination and understanding and in the application of the generic policies of com-
mon sense to promote their harmonious free play. In meeting the demarcation condition, 
the Kantian theory of aesthetic normativity sources aesthetic normativity in a specifically 
aesthetic form of autonomy.
These replies are tentative because, in the end, the debate is about Kant’s core commit-
ments. Perhaps it is a virtue of the autonomy-based theory that it compels a closer look at 
the commitments animating his aesthetics. Aesthetic judgements in the wild are rarely dis-
interested or universal.45 What if Kant’s core commitment in aesthetics is to source aesthetic 
normativity in autonomy? Something like autonomy does seem to us to be expressed in the 
free play of our faculties and in the exercise of common sense.
Kant’s aesthetics is not a live option in philosophy or art studies.46 Some blame certainly goes 
to caricatured readings of the third Critique. Zeroing in on the central commitment to the aes-
thetic as a domain of autonomy as self-legislation might help to undo some of the damage. 
The third Critique has something important to say that has not come through clearly enough.
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